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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT ELDER 
WAS TOTALLY RELEASED FROM ANY PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY. 
The trial court erred in not finding and concluding that Elder was totally released from 
any partnership liability. Because Elder was totally released from any obligations, the trial court 
erred. 
Elder argued throughout the proceedings below that a new agreement supplanted any 
prior agreement. The evidence supported the existence of a new agreement. Tr. At 1358, pp. 45; 
92-99 & Tr. At 1359, pp. 248-250. Specifically, after Elder notified Rutherford that he wanted 
to dissolve the partnership, Rutherford communicated that intent to Birschbach. Tr. At 1358, pp. 
45; 92-93. Rutherford and Birschbach held a meeting at a football field. At that meeting, 
Birschbach and Rutherford agreed to continue with the business relationship without Elder's 
involvement. Birschbach agreed that Rutherford would assume the liabilities of the 
Elder/Rutherford partnership. In essence, Birschbach agreed that he would not look to Elder for 
payment. This agreement was communicated by Birschbach's new partner, Rutherford, to Elder. 
Tr. at 1358, pp. 45; 92-99 & Tr. at 1359, 248-250. 
Clearly, Elder properly preserved the issue of release to the trial court. Birschbach's 
argument that he did not preserve the matter for appeal is disingenuous. In Mills v. Brody, 929 
P.2d 360, 364 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the Court, in discussing the preservation of an issue on 
appeal, stated 
Finally, Brody failed to preserve her claim that the Millses should be estopped from 
refusing to sell their condominium. Although Brody mentioned estoppel in her answer 
and made some references to the issue in a hearing before the trial court, these nominal 
references did not sufficiently raise the issue to a "level of consciousness" before the trial 
court. James v. Preston J 46 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah App. 1987). Because Brody failed to 
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provide the trial court with any legal authority, the trial court could not properly rule on 
the issue. SeeLeBaron & Assocs., Inc. v. Rebel Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah 
App. 1991) (stating that "mere mention of an issue in the pleadings, when no supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in support of the claim, is . . . 
insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal"). 
In the instant case, Elder clearly raised the issue to the "level of consciousness" before the trial 
court. As previously noted, not only did Elder raise release as an affirmative defense in his 
answer, but he also presented substantial evidence before the trial court on that very issue. The 
issue of release was properly preserved for appeal. 
Section 48-1-33, Utah Code Annotated clearly applies to the issues which were before 
the trial court. It is axiomatic that it is the responsibility of a trial court to apply the laws of this 
jurisdiction to the matters which are before it. Section 48-1-33(2) and (3) are directly on point 
with the facts and circumstances of this case: 
48-1-33. Effect of dissolution on partner's existing liability* 
( 1 ) . . . ; 
(2) A partner is discharged for any existing liability upon dissolution of the partnership 
by an agreement to that effect between himself, the partnership creditor and the person or 
partnership continuing the business; and such agreement may be inferred from the course 
of dealing between the creditor having knowledge of the dissolution and the person or 
partnership continuing the business. 
(3) Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dissolved partnership, 
the partners whose obligations have been assumed shall be discharged from any liability 
to any creditor of the partnership who, knowing of the agreement, consents to a material 
alteration in the nature or time of payment of such obligations. 
Applying the foregoing statute, subsection (2) to the facts of this case. Elder and 
Rutherford were partners. Elder and Rutherford agreed to discontinue the partnership. At that 
time, Rutherford went to Birschbach, the creditor, and informed him of Elder's decision. At the 
football field, Birschbach and Rutherford entered an agreement to continue the business. This 
agreement can and should have been inferred by the course of dealings between Birschbach and 
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Rutherford. This agreement discharged Elder's liability in whole to Birschbach. 
Further, when Rutherford agreed to assume the existing liabilities of the partnership, 
Birschbach consented to that assumption. By so doing, he discharged Elder from any liability 
under Section 48-1-33(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). To the extent that the 
Court did not conclude as a matter of law that Elder was released when it concluded that a new 
agreement was entered into between Rutherford and Birschbach, this was an error in law. 
Contrary to Birschbach's argument, it was unnecessary for the Court to find that there 
was an agreement to release Elder from any liability prior to August 31, 1998. Rather, by 
operation of law, upon entering into a new agreement with Rutherford, Birschbach discharged 
Elder of liability for any past partnership obligations which Elder may have owed to Birschbach. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ELDER BREACHED THE 
CONTRACT. 
The trial court erred in concluding that Elder breached a contract with Birschbach. 
Birschbach contends that Elder has the duty to marshal the evidence in support of this finding. 
The existence of a contract is a conclusion of law. See Wadsworth Const v. City of St. George, 
865 P.2d 1373, 1375 (Utah Ct.App. 1993), aff d, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995). There is no dispute 
that an oral agreement existed between Elder as part of a partnership and Birschbach. Further, it 
is also undisputed that at the time of Elder's decision to exit and dissolve the partnership, part of 
the terms of that agreement, i.e. the payment of expenses, had not been fulfilled. However, when 
Rutherford and Birschbach entered their new agreement, this operated as a matter of law of 
discharging Elder's obligations under the contractual agreement between himself as a partner in 
the Elder/Rutherford partnership. Because of this new agreement, as a matter of law, Elder was 
not in breach of any prior agreement. The trial court erred in concluding that a breach which 
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was actionable after the entry of the new agreement occurred. 
HI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT DAMAGES WERE 
CAPABLE OF DETERMINATION. 
The trial court erred in concluding that damages were capable of determination. 
Damages must be shown with reasonable certainty. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 UT 201, 
71 P.3d 188. In the instant action, they were not. Admittedly, damages need not be proven with 
precision, however the evidence in this matter shows that the closest one gets to precision is 
surgery with a butcher knife. 
Birschbach called an accountant who had permitted his CPA certification to lapse who 
estimated damages at approximately $220,000.00 although he admitted that there was inadequate 
information to determine the amount with certainty. Tr. at V. 1358, pp 140-153, 161-65; Tr. at 
V. 1359, p. 324. Elder's expert testified that the deficiency could be around $35,105.61, but that 
the financial records were in such disarray that there was no way to do an analysis with any 
certainty. Tr. at V. 1359, pp. 297-298. 
An award of damages based upon speculation cannot be upheld. Cook Associates, Inc. v. 
Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 1983). The evidence must not be so indefinite as to allow 
the fact finder to speculate freely as to the amount of damages. Penelko, Inc. v. John Price 
Associates, Inc., 642 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1982). 
Clearly, there is a substantial distinction between the lack of need for precision and the 
inability to testify as to damages with any degree of certainty. If the experts called to testify 
could not establish the damages with precision, to prevail Birschbach had to establish his 
damages with at least some degree of certainty. Because the experts called to testify both stated 
that their opinions lacked that certainty, the finder of fact was left to nothing but speculation. 
8 
This was error. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING ELDER'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
AT THE CONCLUSION OF CREDITOR BIRSCHBACH'S CASE IN CHIEF. 
The trial court erred in denying Elder's Motion to Dismiss as the conclusion of 
Birschbach's case in chief. Elder moved to dismiss the action at the conclusion of Birschbach's 
case for his failure to make out a prima facie case as to all of the elements of his claim, relying 
the failure to establish the damage element. The Court denied that Motion to Dismiss. 
As argued above, Birschbach failed to establish his damages with sufficient certainty to 
be legally cognizable. The Court denied that Motion, Elder believes in error. On a Motion to 
Dismiss, the trial court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. When doing so, the Court must then determine whether the non-moving party has made a 
prima facie showing of each of the elements of his claim. Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, 990 
P.2d933. 
As noted above, Elder's expert testified that he could not establish damages with any 
degree of certainty. This is clearly a fairly to establish one of the elements upon which 
Birschbach had the burden of proof. As such, the trial court erred in denying Elder's Motion to 
Dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the trial court erred in not finding and concluding that Elder was totally 
released from any partnership liability based on the subsequent agreements between Rutherford 
and Birschbach. The trial court erred in concluding that Elder breached the contract with 
Birschbach. The trial court erred in concluding that the damages were capable of determination 
with any reasonable degree of certainty. Finally, the trial court erred in not granting Elder's 
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Motion to Dismiss at the conclusion of Birschbach's case where Birschbach failed to establish 
each element of his causes of action by a preponderance of the evidence. This Court should 
reverse the trial court's conclusion that there was only a partial release and reverse the judgment 
entered against Elder in the amount of $22,500.00. This Court should remand the caese to the 
trial court with instruction directing the trial court to enter an order dismissing Birschbach's 
complaint, and all causes of action contained therein, with prejudice. 
Dated and Signed this j[_ day of November, 2003. 
JohifX-Rice J 
Aftafney for Appellee, Deloy Elder 
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